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Data as Labor: Retrofitting Labor Law for
the Platform Economy
Eugene K. Kim*
ABSTRACT
Users of online platform services like YouTube, Google, and
Facebook have begun to form unions in an effort to influence
platform policies, but have received limited attention. While
unions in name, these groups fall outside the ambit of the
National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), because their members are
not compensated and controlled like traditional employees. This
Article distinguishes between “active” contributors, who
consciously contribute to platforms, and “passive” contributors,
who unconsciously generate usable data in their interactions
with platforms, and proposes that labor law can provide a
framework for the organizing attempts of active contributors.
Using the NLRA as a starting point, this Article reconceptualizes
two doctrines of labor law—the definition of employee and the
appropriate bargaining unit—to provide a regulatory framework
for these nascent organizations. While implementing such
changes through federal legislation may be politically difficult,
state action is an alternative means of securing legal recognition
for organizations of active contributors and regulating the use of
passively produced data.
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I. INTRODUCTION

In 2018, a group of YouTube content creators formed what
they called the “YouTubers Union,” hoping to lobby the platform
for greater transparency over video monetization.1 In what was
informally known as the “adpocalypse,” YouTube had
implemented algorithms to ensure that videos met advertisers’
standards,2 but in doing so demonetized content producers in
ways that caught public scrutiny, including the demonetization
1. Bijan Stephen, YouTube Says It Won’t Negotiate with the YouTubers
Union, VERGE (Aug. 26, 2019, 12:55 PM), https://www.theverge.com/2019/8/26
/20833315/youtube-union-youtubers-negotiate-germany-meeting (listing the
creators’ demands, which included “monetization for smaller channels; the right
to speak with a real person if a channel is to be deleted; transparent moderation
decisions; ending demonetization; the end of Google Preferred, a different system for delivering ad money to creators; and the rules around content moderation to be clarified”).
2. Julia Alexander, The Golden Age of YouTube Is Over, VERGE (Apr. 5,
2019, 9:31 AM), https://www.theverge.com/2019/4/5/18287318/youtube-loganpaul-pewdiepie-demonetization-adpocalypse-premium-influencers-creators
(responding to a series of insensitive or graphic postings on popular YouTube
channels, advertisers withdrew from YouTube, partially out of fear of promoting
the content, prompting YouTube to create algorithms that require videos to
meet specific criteria, such as a longer run-time, to be monetized through
advertisements).
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of a number of videos discussing LGBTQ identity and
experience.3 In 2019, the group counted 23,000 members and
presented its demands to YouTube, but the company declined to
meet, stating that it “[had] made clear that [it is] not going to
negotiate their demands.”4
The Union’s efforts are one of many by users of an online
platform to obtain a greater say in the platform’s rules: Facebook
users have attempted to organize to obtain greater control over
their data after the Cambridge Analytica scandal,5 and in a
longer shot, a class of plaintiffs sued Google for requiring its
users to complete visual recognition tasks—known as
CAPTCHAs—without compensation, and then using the data to
train AI systems.6 These efforts vary broadly in the extent to
which their participants may claim to be workers in the classical
sense: YouTubers creating videos would seem to have a stronger
claim to that status than individuals who idly click around
Facebook. Yet one commonality is that, while unions in name,
almost none of these organizations are legally cognizable as
unions under the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), the
American statutory framework for mediating negotiations
between companies and employees. Simply put, contributors to
platforms like YouTube are not considered employees under the
statutory framework.7
Some scholars have described the activity of platform users
as analogous to labor, because their contributions and activity
on the platform are essential inputs for the online platforms and
require some amount of manual exertion, whether that be
clicking a link or producing a video.8 Although these
3. Aja Romano, A Group of YouTubers Is Trying to Prove the Site
Systematically Demonetizes Queer Content, VOX (Oct. 10, 2019, 9:40 AM EDT),
https://www.vox.com/culture/2019/10/10/20893258/youtube-lgbtq-censorshipdemonetization-nerd-city-algorithm-report.
4. Stephen, supra note 1.
5. Toby Sterling, Facebook Users Unite! ‘Data Labour Union’ Launches in
Netherlands, REUTERS (May 23, 2018), https://cn.reuters.com/article/instantarticle/idUSKCN1IO2M3.
6. Rojas-Lozano v. Google, Inc., 159 F. Supp. 3d 1101 (N.D. Cal. 2016).
7. See infra Part III.
8. See generally ERIC A. POSNER & E. GLEN WEYL, RADICAL MARKETS:
UPROOTING CAPITALISM AND DEMOCRACY FOR A JUST SOCIETY 205 (2018)
(analogizing the production of data to labor); Imanol Arrieta Ibarra et al.,
Should We Treat Data as Labor? Moving Beyond “Free”, 108 AM. ECON. ASS’N:
PAPERS & PROC. 38 (2008) (arguing that data should be treated as labor rather
than capital).
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contributions, or “data work,” often feel like leisure—for
instance, liking Facebook pages or producing amusing YouTube
content—the digital economy has transformed once leisurely or
idle activities into economically productive and potentially
lucrative ones. Users’ input can be essential to a platform’s
function, but many users have little say in how a platform is
governed, so scholars and platform users have proposed forming
collective bodies of users to bargain with platforms so that the
platform is responsive to its user’s needs. Similar to the
traditional labor context, platform users have limited bargaining
power in the status quo vis-à-vis platforms, due to the users’
geographic dispersion and the limited number of substitutes for
the platforms’ services. Organizations of users aspire to enhance
the bargaining power of users and give them greater say in how
their data are stored and deployed.
While there have been numerous proposals to regulate or
constrain the power of platform companies like Facebook and
Google,9 there has been less academic work on how to organize
the very users that fuel the platforms’ success, or to regulate
those organizations once formed. Notably, some of these
organizations may be illegal under antitrust law in the status
quo, insofar as they are not legally cognizable as unions and
collude to achieve economic benefit.10 One proposal that has been
gaining traction in the EU is to create data intermediaries that
pool members’ data rights and license them to platforms.11 In
November 2020, the European Commission issued a proposed
9. See, e.g., Jack M. Balkin, Information Fiduciaries and the First
Amendment, 49 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1183 (2016) (arguing “that many online
service providers and cloud companies who collect, analyze, use, sell, and
distribute personal information should be seen as information fiduciaries
toward their customers and end-users”); Josh Simons & Dipayan Ghosh,
Utilities for Democracy: How the Algorithmic Infrastructure of Facebook and
Google Must be Regulated, BROOKINGS INST. (Aug. 2020), https://www.brookin
gs.edu/research/utilities-for-democracy-why-and-how-the-algorithmic-infrastr
ucture-of-facebook-and-google-must-be-regulated (arguing that Facebook and
Google should be regulated under a public utility model).
10. See Sari Mazzurco, Democratizing Platform Privacy, 31 FORDHAM
INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L. J. 792, 860–62 (2021) (describing demands for
data privacy by form of a consumer “mass exit” from the digital platform as a
potential Sherman Act violation for restraining trade).
11. See Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the
Council on European Data Governance, COM (2020) 767 final (Nov. 25, 2020)
(“[The proposal aimed to] foster the availability of data for use by increasing
trust in data intermediaries and by strengthening data-sharing mechanisms
across the EU.”).
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data governance framework to regulate such intermediaries,12
but notably absent from the proposal is any mention that the
intermediaries could exercise user rights collectively.13
This Article makes the case that labor law and its provisions
for collective bargaining are the most sensible mechanisms for
fostering and regulating attempts by certain platform users to
bargain vis-à-vis platforms. In doing so, it stresses the
importance of not just regulating the market power of firms but
the potential effectiveness of building the bargaining power of
users, drawing from the theory of countervailing power
pioneered by John Kenneth Galbraith.14 A purely
deconcentrating approach, for instance through antitrust law,
will have limited effectiveness, due to frictions in online labor
markets15 and network effects16 that make it likely that some
degree of market power among platforms will persist. The
alternative approach would be to foster and regulate
countervailing power on the other side of the market.17 Such a
structure not only serves redistributive goals, but also improves
economic efficiency, by ensuring that workers have the
appropriate incentives to contribute to the market and
preventing firms from reducing equilibrium quantities to

12. Id.
13. Compare id., with Proposal for a Regulation of the European
Parliament and of the Council on European Data Governance Title III, Art.
9(2)(c), at 24 COM (2020) draft (Oct. 2020), https://drive.google.com/file/d/1b
ud4hJKlSAEeqfodHuDbEBcxV9Scppvn/view (mentioning collective action).
14. See generally JOHN KENNETH GALBRAITH, AMERICAN CAPITALISM: THE
CONCEPT OF COUNTERVAILING POWER (1952) (discussing how economic power
can be used to check economic power). For a more recent treatment of how the
law can facilitate countervailing power, see generally Kate Andrias & Benjamin
I. Sachs, Constructing Countervailing Power: Law and Organizing in an Era of
Political Inequality, 130 YALE L.J. 546 (2021).
15. Arindrajit Dube et al., Monopsony in Online Labor Markets, 2 AM.
ECON. REV.: INSIGHTS 33, 44–45 (2020) (finding “strong evidence” that
considerable monopsony power exists “even in a thick labor market where
search frictions may appear to be low”).
16. See, e.g., Feng Zhu & Marco Iansiti, Why Some Platforms Thrive and
Others Don’t, HARV. BUS. REV. (2019), https://hbr.org/2019/01/why-some-platf
orms-thrive-and-others-dont.
17. See, e.g., Mark Stelzner & Mark Paul, How Does Market Power Affect
Wages? Monopsony and Collective Action in an Institutional Context 15 (Dec.
2018) (unpublished manuscript), https://equitablegrowth.org/working-papers/h
ow-does-market-power-affect-wages-monopsony-and-collective-action-in-an-ins
titutional-context.
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suppress price.18 Labor law provides a structure for market
participants to develop this countervailing power in a way that
is economically productive.
This Article separates data work into “active” work, where
users consciously contribute to platforms, and “passive” work,
where platforms collect user data as a byproduct of user activity.
Active data work more closely resembles the classical notion of
labor, and readily lends itself to the enterprise bargaining model
of the NLRA. But if labor law is to remain relevant, policymakers
will need to reimagine what labor law means in the digital age,
as work moves from physical worksites to platforms and
individual contributions shift from physical labor to personal
data. To chart a path forward, this Article starts from the
current federal regime under the NLRA and reconceptualizes
three foundational doctrines of labor law, two of which have to
do with the definition of “employee” that bounds the scope of the
NLRA, and the third of which has to do with the characteristics
along which users can collectively bargain. First, if labor law is
to regulate organizing among data workers, it is worth
considering whether some uncompensated workers should be
considered “employees,” an issue that has been raised in the
context of volunteer interns but is also relevant in the platform
economy: many contributors to the data economy participate
without compensation, but are excluded from the NLRA’s ambit
because the Act does not define “employee” in any specific way.19
Second, the common-law control analysis used under the NLRA
and many state statutes excludes workers not subject to
traditional, top-down supervision, and it is worth considering
whether a greater number of workers should be covered. While
the control requirement has been critiqued in other contexts,
notably gig work20 and subcontracting,21 this Article discusses
how proposals to expand the control requirement of employment
would benefit data workers as well.22 Third and finally, the
NLRB’s analysis of bargaining units—which has traditionally

18. See, e.g., GEORGE J. BORJAS, LABOR ECONOMICS 183–87 (7th ed. 2016)
(describing the monopsony model and the effect of a wage floor).
19. See infra Section II.A.
20. See, e.g., Eugene K. Kim, Note, Labor’s Antitrust Problem: A Case for
Worker Welfare, 130 YALE L.J. 428 (2020).
21. See generally DAVID WEIL, THE FISSURED WORKPLACE: WHY WORK
BECAME SO BAD FOR SO MANY AND WHAT CAN BE DONE TO IMPROVE IT (2017).
22. See infra Section II.B.
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grouped workers along physical worksite boundaries and
employer control hierarchies—will need to embrace a wider
variety of factors as work moves online and traditional control
hierarchies fade. This Article suggests that personal identifying
factors—like age or geography—may be relevant for bargaining
insofar as user data is sold according to those characteristics.23
While efforts to amend the NLRA have been largely
unsuccessful, the Article concludes by discussing the
implications of state legislation and sectoral bargaining in the
data work context, as a means of both advancing labor law
doctrine for active participants and protecting passive
participants.24
This Article proceeds as follows. Part II offers an operational
definition of data work and outlines the argument for extending
protections generally, and through labor law specifically. Part
III uses the data-as-labor lens to outline a critique of the NLRA’s
current definition of employee, proposing changes to labor law
doctrine that can extend coverage to active data workers. Part
IV does the same for the NLRB’s approach to bargaining units,
proposing a new strategy for the agency’s future bargaining
adjudications and potential rulemaking, and discusses how
sectoral bargaining can be used to advance the goals of both
active and passive data workers. Part V concludes.
II. DATA AS LABOR
This Part provides an operational definition of data work
and outlines the economic and dignitary reasons for permitting
data workers to organize. It concludes by considering the various
strategies that have been proposed for enabling and regulating
such organizations, and makes the case that labor law provides
the most sensible framework for ensuring that data workers
have a voice in the platform economy.
A. WHAT IS DATA WORK?
This Article defines data work as the act of contributing
information about oneself or the world to a recipient who derives
an economic benefit. While broad, this definition excludes most
traditional forms of work, which often involve the
transformation of existing resources and capital into goods (e.g.,
23. See infra Section III.A.
24. See infra Section III.B.
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manufacturing), or physical and mental exertion in the provision
of requested services (e.g., medicine). But it includes a wide
variety of tasks that individuals perform on digital platforms,
from conscious and creative tasks like producing YouTube videos
or authoring Wikipedia articles, to more passive tasks like
interacting with Facebook posts or clicking on Google results.
The notion of data work is premised on the insight that the
digital age has transformed behaviors that might once have been
considered leisurely or idle into economically productive ones. In
the platform economy, individuals opining on the merits of toys
or playing games have become multi-millionaires,25 and these
contributors collectively drive the business models of the world’s
most influential platforms. Users completing CAPTCHAs to
prove they are human help Google digitize books26 and train
image recognition systems that power driverless cars.27 Data
work as a concept calls attention to the social benefits of these
forms of activity and the extent to which the individuals that
perform them have a say in how their contributions are used.
Some forms of data work will be more active or conscious
than others. On the active side are creative, long-term forms of
data work like creating video content, which may more clearly
resemble “labor” as traditionally understood: requiring physical
and mental exertion, planning, or sacrifice. On the passive side
are near-clerical or inadvertent contributions, like building
search histories on Amazon or liking content on Facebook. These
behaviors, while they generate economically productive data,
consume minimal mental energy. Some forms of data work are
paid, while others are unpaid: YouTube compensates some (but
not all) of its content creators per ad click or view, and
participants on platforms like Google Task Mate28 and Amazon

25. Caitlin O’Kane, Top 10 Highest-Paid YouTube Stars of 2018, According
to Forbes, CBS NEWS (Dec. 4, 2018, 12:13 PM), https://www.cbsnews.com/ne
ws/top-10-highest-paid-youtube-stars-of-2018-forbes.
26. Guy Gugliotta, Deciphering Old Texts, One Woozy, Curvy Word at a
Time, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 28, 2011), https://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/29/scien
ce/29recaptcha.html.
27. James O’Malley, Captcha If You Can: How You’ve Been Training AI For
Years Without Realising It, TECHRADAR (Jan. 12, 2018), https://www.techrada
r.com/news/captcha-if-you-can-how-youve-been-training-ai-for-years-withoutrealising-it.
28. Task Mate, GOOGLE PLAY, https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?i
d=com.google.android.apps.nbu.tinytask&hl=en_US&gl=IN (last visited Nov.
16, 2021) (“Earn money by completing tasks for businesses around the world on
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mTurk29 are paid for more passive tasks. On the other side, most
Instagram content producers are unpaid (although the platform
recently announced YouTube-like compensation for producers of
video content),30 and most forms of passive data work, like
Facebook, Amazon, or Google use, are uncompensated.
Compensated
Active
Passive

Some

YouTube

content

Uncompensated
Facebook content; Wikipedia

creators

editors31

Amazon mTurk

Google search queries

Figure 1. Data work, compensation, and exertion.

In addition, data workers can be distinguished by the extent
to which they perceive themselves to be part of a community.
Many platform users have little to no interaction with others,
like Google users. Yet others have consciously organized
themselves into groups, like Facebook users. And in the middle
are users who have social interactions but relatively
unstructured ones, like YouTube subscribers or commenters. We
might expect that Facebook users and YouTube users would be
more likely to view themselves as a community than Google
users.

Google’s Task Mate app. Examples of tasks include taking a photo of a nearby
restaurant, answering survey questions, or helping translate sentences from
English to your local language.”).
29. Amazon Mechanical Turk, MTURK, https://www.mturk.com/ (last
visited Nov. 16, 2021) (“Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk) is a crowdsourcing
marketplace that makes it easier for individuals and businesses to outsource
their processes and jobs to a distributed workforce who can perform these tasks
virtually. This could include anything from conducting simple data validation
and research to more subjective tasks like survey participation, content
moderation, and more.”).
30. Arielle Pardes, Instagram Will (Finally) Pay Influencers, WIRED (May
27, 2020, 11:00 AM), https://www.wired.com/story/instagram-finally-pay-influe
ncers-badges-igtv-ads.
31. Some Wikipedia editors are paid by outside organizations, raising
concerns of bias. Joe Pinsker, The Covert World of People Trying to Edit
Wikipedia—For Pay, ATLANTIC (Aug. 11, 2015), https://www.theatlantic.com/b
usiness/archive/2015/08/wikipedia-editors-for-pay/393926 (describing a case
where business employees of a medical device manufacturer attempted to edit
the Wikipedia page of a surgical procedure that uses their device).
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Facebook, social networks

Unstructured social interactions

YouTube, blogs

Minimally social

Google, mTurk

Figure 2. Data work and group identification.

This taxonomy illustrates the heterogeneity of the data
economy, for which a single regulatory regime would likely be
inapt. But before discussing the regulatory structure under
which data workers might bargain with platforms, this Article
turns to the question of why such bargaining could be socially
productive.
B. WHY PROTECT DATA WORKERS?
Allowing data workers to organize can be defended not just
as a matter of economic equity, but one of efficiency as well. This
Section outlines both explanations.
1. Equity and Dignity
Policymakers have wrestled with the question of how to
address job displacement that results from automation. One
prominent proposal is the enactment of a universal basic income
(UBI), which guarantees a certain amount of money to lowincome or unemployed workers.32 Income guarantees such as
these are designed to prevent the exacerbation of income
inequality given that technology tends to increase the returns to
capital and skilled labor, while it reduces returns to lowerskilled labor.
The data as labor framework offers another perspective to
the problem and challenges the notion that low-skilled labor will
be rendered helpless by technological changes.33 Rather, labordisplacing technologies like AI depend on vast data sets that
these same individuals produce, whether by teaching a
CAPTCHA how to identify stoplights or teaching algorithms
about individual consumption habits. Rather than reduce the
return to low-skilled labor, technology depends crucially upon

32. E.g., Andrew Yang, Universal Basic Income is the Solution to a
Worsening Problem, THE HILL (Jan. 11, 2019, 7:00 AM), https://thehill.com/opi
nion/finance/424766-universal-basic-income-is-the-solution-to-a-worseningproblem.
33. For a seminal discussion of this idea, see Ibarra et al., supra note 8, at
39.
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it—indeed, computing the “return to data” is an active area of
economic research.34 However, as stands, producers of datadependent technologies have little incentive to compensate or
collaborate with data producers, given the geographic dispersion
of those producers and the absence of bargaining channels. It is
crucial to note that many of these technologies are made publicly
accessible for free—for instance, Google’s search engine. But
others are not, and as artificial intelligence continues to advance
and its capabilities grow more sophisticated, the returns to data
may very well increase rather than decrease,35 exacerbating
inequality unless data workers retain a seat at the table.
While much data work can appear like leisure, the
technological advances of the last few decades indicate that data
work is socially productive. Enabling platform users to make
requests of platforms would recognize the value of their
contributions in a way a UBI would not.
2. Efficiency
In addition to helping attain a more even distribution of
economic resources, organizing data workers may expand the
pool of resources available if the market for data is a monopsony
or oligopsony. Under a classic model of labor monopsony, firms
reduce the quantity of labor demanded to suppress wages and
boost profit.36 This causes employment to be inefficiently low.
One way of correcting the inefficiency that arises from
monopsony is to allow workers to bargain for wages, such that
the monopsonist is no longer a price setter. By bringing wages
closer to competitive equilibrium levels, employment and output
increases. In the context of the platform economy, monopsonists
34. Ibarra et al., supra note 8, at 42.
35. See, e.g., POSNER & WEYL, supra note 8, at 224–30. Estimating the
marginal product of data is a subject of ongoing research, although one
unpublished study of the data generated by Uber drivers suggests drivers would
receive significant payment if they formed a data union. One seminal, though
indirect, study of the value of user contributions to platforms demonstrated that
Google click-through rates dropped from 26 to 14 percent when Wikipedia
results were removed, indicating that Google’s ad revenues benefit crucially
from the voluntary contributions of Wikipedia editors. These benefits greatly
exceed those that might obtain from improvements to search algorithms.
Connor McMahon et al., The Substantial Interdependence of Wikipedia and
Google: A Case Study on the Relationship Between Peer Production
Communities and Information Technologies, 2017 ICWSM 142, https://ojs.aaai
.org/index.php/ICWSM/article/download/14883/14733.
36. Borjas, supra note 18, at 183–87.
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could suppress the effective “price” they pay for data, whether
that price takes the form of cash payments, free services, or userfavorable terms, lowering the amount of data produced and
contributed at equilibrium. Data worker organizations could
bargain for higher payments, better services, or more favorable
terms, increasing data production. Whether or not platforms are
monopsonists is an empirical question that will depend crucially
on market definition, and the extent to which users can
substitute between platforms. But in data markets where users
have few viable substitutes, some degree of user organization
can help ensure that users are properly rewarded for their
contributions, increasing both the quality and quantity of data
produced. This is especially true in markets for active data,
where data production is conscious and more likely to respond to
incentives.37 Some services already attempt to compensate
individuals for the data they produce: Amazon MTurk is a wellknown example of a paid crowdwork platform, and other firms
pay individuals to test their algorithms.38
C. WHY LABOR LAW?
The question of whether collectors of data—what Jaron
Lanier calls “siren servers”39—represent a monopsony or
oligopsony is an empirical question that depends crucially on
market definition and is beyond the scope of this paper. But as
popular attention to the influence of platforms has grown, so has
the call for greater antitrust enforcement.40 Antitrust law aims
to keep markets competitive, ensuring that all commodities—

37. But see Elizabeth Anderson, Beyond Homo Economicus: New
Developments in Theories of Social Norms, 29 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 170, 197 (2000)
(discussing how material incentives may “crowd out” intrinsic motivation to do
certain tasks).
38. See, e.g., Annalee Newitz, The Secret Lives of Google Raters, ARS
TECHNICA (Apr. 27, 2017, 9:40 AM), https://arstechnica.com/features/2017/04/th
e-secret-lives-of-google-raters.
39. JARON LANIER, WHO OWNS THE FUTURE? 53–58 (2014).
40. See, e.g., John D. McKinnon, Republican and Democrat Lawmakers
Step Up Efforts to Adopt Tougher Tech Laws, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 19, 2021),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-lawmakers-step-up-pressure-to-adopt-toughe
r-tech-laws-11634635802 (“Legislation to curb the influence of big technology
companies, including putting new restrictions on online content, is starting to
gain traction in Congress as lawmakers narrow their targets and seek to build
on public attention.”).
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including data—are efficiently priced.41 Because the platform
economy presents new challenges for the application of antitrust
laws, scholars and policymakers have worked extensively to
develop new economic frameworks and legal remedies to address
the unique issues involved.42
Rather than focus solely on deconcentrating market power,
this Article makes the case for amplifying the voice of platform
users. In doing so, it draws on the theory of “countervailing
power”43 that resembles the theory of balance of power from
international relations. While the economic ideal is for all
markets to be competitive—both labor demand and labor
supply—it is possible for efficient outcomes to be reached under
monopsony conditions if there is also market power on the labor
supply side.44 Recall that under monopsony, employers reduce
employment to depress wages and increase prices. To be more
complete, we can consider not just wages but also non-monetary
forms of compensation, benefits, work conditions, etc.: these
aspects of employment will also be suppressed under
monopsony. If workers also have market power, they will be able
to bargain for higher quality-adjusted wages that are close to the
workers’ marginal productivity. Although higher input costs
would appear inefficient, a monopsonist’s effective marginal
costs decrease in the presence of supply-side market power: this
is because monopsonists face two costs when hiring, the first
being marginal wages, and the second being lost profits due to
increased wages across the board. Worker organizations remove
the latter effect by bargaining for wages, reducing effective
marginal costs, and incentivizing greater employment and
production.
As a second-best strategy, countervailing power is easiest to
justify when market power appears inevitable on one side of the
market, and there are two reasons to believe this may be the case
41. See The Antitrust Laws, FED. TRADE COMM’N, https://www.ftc.gov/tipsadvice/competition-guidance/guide-antitrust-laws/antitrust-laws (last visited
Nov. 16, 2021) (“Congress passed the first antitrust law, the Sherman Act, in
1890 as a comprehensive charter of economic liberty aimed at preserving free
and unfettered competition as the rule of trade.” (internal quotation omitted)).
42. See, e.g., Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust and Platform Monopoly, 130
YALE L.J. 1952 (2021); Lina M. Khan, The Separation of Platforms and
Commerce, 119 COLUM. L. REV. 973 (2019).
43. GALBRAITH, supra note 14.
44. See Stelzner & Paul, supra note 17, at 15 (empirical evidence); BORJAS,
supra note 18, at 183–87 (discussing effects of wage floors in monopsony).
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within the market for digital labor. First, empirical studies have
discovered significant labor market frictions in the market for
platform work: one study of Amazon’s MTurk found that work
requesters (employers) had significant market power, arising in
part from workers’ inability to differentiate between different
tasks, requesters’ inability to differentiate between workers, and
other information asymmetries.45 Even while online platforms
have the power to drastically reduce the search and moving costs
we might traditionally associate with physical labor markets,
certain labor market frictions—including the fundamental task
of matching workers with hirers—seem to persist.
Second, network effects in the platform economy mean that
there will be significant economic forces in favor of consolidation.
The utility to consumers of four undifferentiated social
networks, each with one-fourth the membership of Facebook, is
less than the utility of one Facebook, given that individuals
value the platform more if it has more users. Therefore, reducing
the platform economy to an atomistically competitive one may
sacrifice economic gains. Labor law—and worker organizing—
can be a way to confront the demand-side market power that will
exist either due to network effects or labor market frictions, and
fairly distribute the benefits that arise from the platform
economy.
As an alternative approach, scholars such as Jack Balkin
suggest that platforms can be regulated and deemed to have
fiduciary duties to their users, as doctors and lawyers have to
their clients.46 But this “information fiduciary” approach has
been criticized because for-profit platforms will have conflicting
duties to their shareholders.47 A similar issue pertains to efforts
by platforms to self-regulate.48 As other scholars have noted, a
more lasting solution would be to alter market structure in a way
that restores or approximates competitive markets, and allows
45. See Dube et al., supra note 15, at 44–45.
46. Balkin, supra note 9, at 1186 (introducing the “information fiduciary”).
47. Sylvie Delacroix & Neil D. Lawrence, Bottom-up Data Trusts:
Disturbing the ‘One Size Fits All’ Approach to Data Governance, 9 INT’L DATA
PRIV. L. 236, 241–42 (2019); Lina M. Khan & David E. Pozen, A Skeptical View
of Information Fiduciaries, 133 HARV. L. REV. 497, 504 (2019).
48. See, e.g., Lily Hay Newman, Google Will Delete Your Data by Default—
In 18 Months, WIRED (June 24, 2020, 12:36 PM), https://www.wired.com/sto
ry/google-auto-delete-data. Other search engines, notably Bing, explicitly
reward users for using the search engine. Microsoft Rewards, MICROSOFT,
https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/rewards (last visited Oct. 24, 2021).
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parties to reach a competitive equilibrium by pursuing their selfinterest.49
Another approach would be to expand the protections of
employment law, or the basic entitlements that society grants to
workers. For example, the Russell Sage Foundation has
privately implemented a minimum wage for crowdsourced
work.50 But because some workers place a high premium on
flexible work, the one-size-fits-all solution of employment law
may reduce opportunities for workers to benefit from existing
flexibility. Collective bargaining gives workers the right, not the
obligation, to organize; if they exercise that right, workers and
management can achieve compromises tailored to each
workplace.
The strongest case for reforming labor law comes from the
fact that data workers unions have already begun to form. In
2019, YouTube announced that it would not negotiate with the
YouTubers Union, an early-stage organizing effort that focused
its efforts on YouTube’s video monetization policies.51 The union
received greater attention once it gained the support of IG
Metall, the largest industrial union in Europe, and earned a
meeting with Google Germany to “discuss some fundamental
questions about the future of work,” but tangible progress is still
forthcoming.52 While data workers unions are gaining traction,
there is no regulatory structure to foster dialogues with
platforms or place legal boundaries on organizing activity.
Labor law is not the only way to build countervailing
power.53 One alternative, which is an active topic of discussion
49. Delacroix & Lawrence, supra note 47, at 240; Khan & Pozen, supra note
47, at 528. There have also been efforts to deliver ads to viewers without
tracking them or selling their data. Ethical Ads, READ THE DOCS,
https://docs.readthedocs.io/en/stable/advertising/ethical-advertising.html (last
updated Sept. 3, 2020).
50. Research Grants: Budget Requirements, RUSSELL SAGE FOUND.,
https://www.russellsage.org/how-to-apply/apply-project-grants/budget (“With
increasing frequency, academic researchers use crowdsourcing workers (e.g.,
MTurk) to complete study-related tasks. RSF requires that compensation for
crowdsourcing workers be appropriate for the time and effort that they devote
to their study-related task. The payment amount must be based on the
minimum wage in the state where the fiscal agent for the grant is located or at
least $10.00 per hour, whichever is higher.”) (last visited Oct. 24, 2021).
51. See Stephen, supra note 1.
52. Id.
53. See, e.g., Andrias & Sachs, supra note 14, at 560 (discussing how legal
regimes may be constructed to best facilitate countervailing power).
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in the EU, would be a market-based, property-law solution that
creates data cooperatives or coalitions to trade member data to
platforms, similar to royalty-sharing organizations like
Broadcast Music, Inc. (BMI)54 and the American Society of
Composers, Authors and Publishers (ASCAP).55, 56 If
governments are able to grant individuals strong property rights
in their data, individuals can license their data to cooperatives,
which would sell the data as a bundle to platforms. This solution
has its greatest appeal for passive data production, which often
goes unnoticed by the contributor and is generally homogeneous,
making it easy to aggregate and sell. For active data production,
however, aggregating and valuing user contributions will be
harder given their heterogeneity. Labor law provides a
framework for grouping contributors and for selecting
representatives to bargain over a wide range of factors in the
platform relationship, whether or not the final outcome is
compensation for services performed.
This Article decomposes the task of retrofitting labor law by
identifying two key questions that define the scope of labor law:
(1) who is protected, and (2) along what lines can workers
organize. It then suggests that if labor law is to embrace data
work, its answers to both of these questions must change. Part
III addresses the first question by examining and proposing an
alternative to labor law’s current definition of “employee,” with
a focus on unpaid workers and workers outside of traditional
control structures. Part IV addresses the second question by
demonstrating how traditional bargaining unit factors are
inappropriate for the platform economy, proposing new factors
to supplement them, and proposing sector-wide bargaining as a
solution for passive data workers.
54. See About, BMI, https://www.bmi.com/about (last visited Nov. 16, 2021)
(“BMI was founded in 1939 by forward-thinkers who wanted to represent
songwriters in emerging genres, like jazz, blues and country, and protect the
public performances of their music. Operating on a non-profit-making basis,
BMI is now the largest music rights organization in the U.S. and is still
nurturing new talent and new music.”).
55. See About Us, ASCAP, https://www.ascap.com/about-us (last visited
Nov. 16, 2021) (“We license over 16 million ASCAP songs and scores to the
businesses that play them publicly, then send the money to our members as
royalties.”).
56. Others have proposed “data trusts” that would also collectively exercise
individual data rights. Delacroix & Lawrence, supra note 47, at 240–41; see also
Katharina Pistor, Rule by Data: The End of Markets? 83 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS.
101, 120–22 (2020) (proposing a collective governance structure for databases).
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III. RETHINKING EMPLOYMENT: BEYOND
COMPENSATION AND CONTROL
This Part proposes two critiques of the definition of
“employee” that currently dictates the scope of the NLRA’s
protections, and proposes amended standards that would cover
active data workers, i.e., data workers who purposefully
contribute to platforms that derive an economic benefit from
their contributions. This proposal leaves the protection of
passive data work, which is far broader, to the possibility of
sectoral bargaining, described infra in Section III.B.
The current definition of “employee” under the NLRA
requires that an employee be both compensated and controlled
by the employer.57 The first two Sections in this Part address
each prong in turn and make the case that accommodating active
data work will require protecting workers who are
uncompensated or not subject to traditional supervision. The
final Section explores the role state action can play in
implementing reforms.
A. PROTECTING UNPAID LABOR
This Section focuses on the first prong of how courts have
defined “employee” in the NLRA context: namely, the
requirement that an employee be hired, or receive compensation
for their services. While some data workers are paid by their
platforms, most data workers, even among the subset that this
Article classifies as “active,” are uncompensated, although the
platforms benefit from their contributions. These contributors
would have no collective bargaining remedy under the NLRA’s
definition of “employee.” Subsection 1 outlines the current law
and its origins, Subsection 2 presents an economic rationale for
why more unpaid workers, like unpaid data workers, should be
allowed to collectively bargain, and Subsection 3 proposes an
alternative test for the compensation prong and discusses its
ramifications.
While this Article is mostly motivated by the rise of data
work, the question of whether to protect unpaid workers long

57. See Seattle Opera v. NLRB, 292 F.3d 757, 762 (D.C. Cir. 2002); Amnesty
International, 2019 NLRB LEXIS 632, at *8–9 (2019); WBAI Pacifica
Foundation, 328 N.L.R.B. 1273, 1275 (1999).
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predates the platform economy.58 Most of the case law to date
has focused on the non-profit sector, and sensibly so: the Fair
Labor Standards Act (FLSA) prohibits for-profit firms from
hiring unpaid volunteers.59 Unsurprisingly, much of the
scholarship and case law tends to favor non-profit firms, and is
wary of protecting volunteers lest the legal burden discourage
altruism.60 However, the emergence of data work—which is
performed for for-profit firms—provides a new perspective for
understanding uncompensated work.
1. The Origins of the Current Approach
Under current law, the first step of a court’s inquiry into
whether a worker is an employee is whether or not the worker is
compensated. For the majority of active data workers who
receive no compensation for their contributions, the inquiry will
end here. Courts and the NLRB have held that the NLRA only
protects workers who are compensated and receive more than
nominal compensation. Within the labor law context, the leading
case on the topic is Seattle Opera v. NLRB, a case decided by the
D.C. Circuit concerning whether auxiliary choristers, who
received only a flat $214 per production, had the right to bargain
collectively with the Seattle Opera.61 The court held that a
person is an “employee” if “(1) he works for a statutory employer
in return for financial or other compensation . . . and (2) the
statutory employer has the power or right to control and direct
the person in the material details of how such work is to be
performed.”62 The court then found that the $214 payment was
sufficient compensation, because it was given “in return for labor
or services performed” and was not a “reimbursement for out of

58. See, e.g., Mitchell H. Rubinstein, Our Nation’s Forgotten Workers:
Unprotected Volunteers, 9 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 147–50 (2006); Leda E. Dunn,
Note, “Protection” of Volunteers Under Federal Employment Law: Discouraging
Voluntarism? 61 FORDHAM L. REV. 451–53 (1992).
59. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 203(e)(4)–(5) (2018) (excluding volunteers for the
government or non-profit firms from FLSA’s protections); 29 C.F.R. § 553.101
(2020) (defining volunteer).
60. See, e.g., Dunn, supra note 58, at 453 (“This Note argues that the
present disparity in coverage of volunteer workers under federal employment
laws discourages voluntarism by excluding from the definition of employee
volunteer workers who need protection, while extending coverage to volunteer
workers who neither need nor desire such coverage.”).
61. 292 F.3d at 759–60.
62. Id. at 762.
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pocket costs,”63 and also found that the choristers were
controlled by the Seattle Opera.64 In line with the D.C. Circuit’s
reasoning, the NLRB has consistently held that individuals who
are paid nothing for their work will not be considered employees
under the NLRA.65
Most data workers are not paid any money at all, suggesting
they would not be considered employees under Seattle Opera.
However, one might argue that in exchange for their data, users
get the benefit of using the platform.66 In other words, even
though many data workers receive no money, there is another
issue of whether the nonpecuniary benefits they receive from the
platform would be considered compensation or just nominal
benefits.
Courts have struggled to determine what constitutes
compensation, in cases where workers receive some benefits but
not much compared to a prototypical employee. Seattle Opera
itself is one example: while all three judges appeared to agree
that reimbursement for out-of-pocket expenses would not count
as compensation, Judge Randolph, in dissent, characterized the
$214 as reimbursement, performing some back-of-the-envelope
math to suggest it might not even cover travel and parking
costs.67 In WBAI Pacifica, the NLRB seemed open to the
possibility that reimbursement for travel and child care could
constitute compensation, but disregarded the point due to
insufficient evidence that volunteers actually claimed such
reimbursement.68 We can look to cases concerning employment
status at nonprofits under Title VII, which courts have also
interpreted to cover only compensated workers, but in these
cases as well, defining compensation requires some careful linedrawing:

63. Id. at 762–63.
64. Id. at 765.
65. See, e.g., Amnesty International, 2019 NLRB LEXIS 632 (2019); WBAI
Pacifica Foundation, 328 N.L.R.B. 1273, 1273 (1999).
66. See, e.g., Scott Goodson, If You’re Not Paying For It, You Become the
Product, FORBES (Mar. 5, 2012, 12:34 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/marke
tshare/2012/03/05/if-youre-not-paying-for-it-you-become-the-product/?sh=3e40
90e75d6e.
67. 292 F.3d at 774–75 (Randolph, J., dissenting).
68. WBAI Pacifica, 328 N.L.R.B. at 1275.
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(A) A visiting lecturer provided with library privileges at a
medical school and no other compensation was deemed not
compensated.69
(B) A search-and-rescue pilot who was eligible for death
benefits, free military flights, free flight simulator time,
tax deductions, air time, and training was deemed not
compensated.70
(C) A volunteer firefighter who received a retirement
pension, life insurance, death benefits, disability
insurance, and some medical benefits was deemed
compensated.71
These cases taken together seem to suggest that courts
currently consider compensation to include salary or “numerous
job-related benefits,”72 and to exclude isolated benefits or
reimbursement for expenses. Therefore, data workers whose
only reward is access to a platform’s services—for example,
Facebook contributors—would probably not be considered
employees in the status quo, which easily aligns with current
intuitions about labor.
The
question
of
whether
employment
requires
compensation under the NLRA is in large part an issue of
statutory interpretation, although the NLRA itself offers little
guidance. “Employee” is defined, circularly, to “include any
employee,”73 leaving many judges to consult dictionaries for the
ordinary meaning of the term. In NLRB v. Town & Country
Electric, the Supreme Court cited the American Heritage
Dictionary, writing that “[t]he ordinary dictionary definition of
‘employee’ includes any ‘person who works for another in return
for financial or other compensation.’”74 The case was not decided
on the compensation prong, but rather endorsed the agency’s
ability to interpret “employee” broadly.75 However, Town &
Country Electric’s ordinary meaning approach was cited in
Seattle Opera to conclude that workers must be compensated to
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.

Tadros v. Coleman, 717 F. Supp. 996, 998, 1005 (S.D.N.Y. 1989).
Neff v. Civil Air Patrol, 916 F. Supp. 710, 714–15 (S.D. Ohio 1996).
Pietras v. Bd. of Fire Comm’rs, 180 F.3d 468, 471, 473 (2d Cir. 1999).
Id. at 473.
29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (2018).
516 U.S. 85, 90 (1995).
Id.
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be considered employees.76 Similarly, the Eighth Circuit cited
Webster’s Dictionary in reaching the same conclusion under
Title VII.77
The compensation requirement also seems influenced by the
“economic realities” test used to define employee status under
FLSA. Under the economic realities test, courts look not to
traditional signals of employer control, as under the commonlaw agency test traditionally used to define “employee” under the
NLRA,78 but rather to how much the employee depends
economically on his or her employer.79 This test would suggest
that most volunteers would not be employees, because they are
economically independent. Yet in Tony & Susan Alamo
Foundation v. Secretary of Labor, the Supreme Court applied the
economic realities test to find that volunteer workers were
employees covered by FLSA.80 The case concerned a religious
foundation that earned income from a number of commercial
businesses staffed by “volunteers,” many of whom were “drug
addicts, derelicts, or criminals.”81 The volunteers “received no
cash salaries, but the Foundation provide[d] them with food,
clothing, shelter, and other benefits.”82 The Court found these
benefits were sufficient to foster economic dependency and
constitute compensation,83 but stressed the unusual
circumstances and noted that “[o]rdinary volunteerism is not
threatened by this interpretation of [FLSA].”84 As examples of
“ordinary volunteerism,” it listed “volunteers who drive the
elderly to church, serve church suppers, or help remodel a
church home for the needy,” 85 seeming to refer to noncommercial activities involving economically independent
workers. This case appears to be the only time the Supreme
Court has ruled on the employee status of volunteers, so it is
76. Seattle Opera v. NLRB, 292 F.3d 757, 761–62 (2002).
77. Graves v. Women’s Pro. Rodeo Ass’n, 907 F.2d 71, 73 (8th Cir. 1990).
78. See, e.g., FedEx Home Delivery v. NLRB, 563 F.3d 492, 495 (D.C. Cir.
2009).
79. See, e.g., Tony & Susan Alamo Found. v. Sec’y of Lab., 417 U.S. 290,
301 (1985); Goldberg v. Whitaker House Cooperative, Inc., 366 U.S. 28, 33–34
(1961).
80. Tony & Susan Alamo Found., 417 U.S. 290.
81. Id. at 292.
82. Id. at 290.
83. Id. at 301.
84. Id. at 302–03.
85. Id.
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unsurprising that its approach has been cited even beyond the
FLSA context. The economic realities approach has been cited in
the Title VII context to require that employees be
compensated,86 and has been referenced in NLRB decisions on
employee status.87
In addition to these statutory and precedential arguments,
courts and the NLRB also seem persuaded by the argument that
volunteers do not need legal protection because the work is
intrinsically fulfilling. In his Seattle Opera dissent, Judge
Randolph cited Walling v. Portland Terminal, in which the
Supreme Court “refused to sweep within the law ‘each person
who, without promise or expectation of compensation, but solely
for his personal purpose or pleasure worked in activities carried
on by other persons either for pleasure or profit.’”88 Similarly, in
WBAI Pacifica, the NLRB noted that the workers at hand “do
not work for ‘hire’ in the ordinary sense of the word,” but “work
out of an interest in seeing the station continue to exist and
thrive, out of concern for the content of the programs they
produce, and for the personal enrichment of doing a service to
the community and receiving recognition from the
community.”89
In essence, courts and agencies believe that worker wages
in these cases are zero because labor supply is high—the work is
beneficial or intrinsically fulfilling, meaning that the marketclearing wage is non-positive. This logic has led some observers
to criticize legal protections for volunteers, on the ground that
the legal burden would discourage volunteerism.90
2. The Limitations of the Current Approach
Prices are determined jointly by supply and demand. In the
labor market, prices are wages, which are determined both by
individuals’ supply of labor and firms’ demand for that labor.
Therefore, if wages are low, there are two potential explanations:
lots of individuals want to work, or few firms want to hire.
86. Tadros v. Coleman, 717 F. Supp. 996, 1004 (S.D.N.Y. 1989).
87. See WBAI Pacifica, 328 N.L.R.B. 1273, 1276 (1999) (“Unpaid staff do
not depend upon the Employer, even in part for their livelihood or for the
improvement of their economic standards.”).
88. Seattle Opera v. NLRB, 292 F.3d 757, 774 (emphasis added) (citing
Walling v. Portland Terminal, 330 U.S. 148, 152 (1947)).
89. 328 N.L.R.B. at 1275.
90. See, e.g., Dunn, supra note 58, at 453.

2022]

DATA AS LABOR

153

The current law on volunteer labor emphasizes its high
supply, but seldom explores the possibility that demand is low,
or more importantly, the reasons that demand may be low. This
Article makes the case that platforms with monopsony power
have an incentive to suppress their demand for user
contributions to decrease its price and increase profit. To be sure,
the supply-side explanation is compelling in the nonprofit
context, which is where the question of volunteer labor has
almost exclusively arisen. Individuals like the “volunteers who
drive the elderly to church, serve church suppers, or help
remodel a church home for the needy”91 hypothesized in Tony &
Susan Alamo Foundation would seem primarily motivated by a
desire to serve their community or act out the principles of their
faith, rather than a need for economic compensation. In these
cases, it is logical that wages would be zero: volunteers are
enthusiastic to work because they find the work intrinsically
fulfilling, increasing labor supply and reducing wages.
Therefore, the argument goes, it makes no sense to suppress
labor demand by imposing regulatory burdens on hirers: the
more volunteer laborers, the better, both for the volunteers and
for society.
In the non-profit altruism context, low labor demand may
also justify low (or zero) wages. Part of the reason a charity may
not compensate its volunteers is that it reaps little to no
economic benefit from their work, which primarily benefits the
community at large. In other words, from the charity’s
perspective, the marginal product of a given worker is close to
zero, and it is no surprise that the charity would be unwilling or
unable to compensate that worker.
However, policymakers must look to the reasons for low
demand when considering appropriate responses. In the case of
the archetypal charity (consider a food bank), demand is low
because marginal products are low. If policymakers were
concerned about the work conditions of volunteers, imposing
additional burdens on charities would be pointless. One proper
response would be to allow charities to internalize their positive
externalities, and possibly compensate charities for the good

91. Tony & Susan Alamo Found. v. Sec’y of Lab., 417 U.S. 290, 302–03
(1985).
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they confer on the community. To some extent, this is already
accomplished by tax deductions for charitable donations.92
In other cases, demand will be low due to bargaining power
on the side of the hirer, and in these cases imposing burdens on
the hirer is essential to restoring market balance. Consider, for
instance, the unpaid internships that students take with nonprofit organizations. While many of these students will be drawn
to the mission of the organization, and it is possible that some of
them would decline compensation even if offered, for many
students these unpaid internships are the only way to gain
experience and burnish their credentials. In one seminal case, a
student was required by her college to work for 200 hours as an
unpaid intern, but was then legally barred from pursuing a
sexual harassment claim under Title VII against her supervisor
because she was uncompensated and not an “employee.”93 The
court later found that she was also barred from filing her claim
under Title IX because her internship was not an “education
program or activity.”94 The court’s decision under Title VII was
consistent with other decisions interpreting the statute.95 But it
is unclear why Title VII’s protections end where they do:
volunteers like unpaid interns can be subject to poor work
conditions like any other worker, and the fact that they are
volunteers may reflect a lack of bargaining power that hirers can
exploit.
Current market prices for data may reflect a similar market
structure. To be sure, many data workers are paid outright.
Even contributors who do not receive money for their
contributions can be considered compensated in some sense: in
exchange for their contributions to platforms, they receive access
to those very platforms, and for many the act of contributing may
be intrinsically fulfilling. The fact that individuals willingly
contribute to platforms, however, does not imply that the current
market equilibrium is optimal. If collectors of data have market
power, they will be able to reduce the effective cost of data, which
we can interpret as including not just monetary compensation to

92. See 26 U.S.C. § 170 (2018) (“There shall be allowed as a deduction
any charitable contribution . . . payment of which is made within the taxable
year.”).
93. O’Connor v. Davis, 126 F.3d 112, 113, 115–16 (2d Cir. 1997).
94. Id. at 119.
95. Id. at 115–16 (citing Tadros v. Coleman, 898 F.2d 10, 11 (2d Cir. 1990);
Graves v. Women’s Prof’l Rodeo Ass’n, 907 F.2d 71, 74 (8th Cir. 1990)).
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users but also control over how the platform operates. An
important distinction between the data as labor context and the
charity example explored above is that most platforms are forprofit businesses, and as such cannot claim that labor demand
is low due to zero marginal product.
American labor law and the collective bargaining
framework exist to ensure that bargaining power is balanced,
and that negotiations produce solutions tailored for each
workplace. While much of the discussion above has centered
around price and wage for simplicity’s sake, there are many
other dimensions of the platform user experience that can be
subject to discussion, such as when users can be removed from
the platform, or how the platform can use their data. Collective
bargaining allows workers to reach compromises with managers
in a way that reflects both worker priorities and practical
realities. Crucially, labor law provides workers with the option,
but not the obligation, to bargain. If most users find their
contributions intrinsically fulfilling or morally validating, they
do not have to bargain with the platform at all.
This Subsection has made the case that by excluding
uncompensated workers, labor law excludes workers that may
lack the bargaining power that the NLRA was meant to provide.
The next Subsection proposes an alternative approach to
“employee” that would encompass those workers.
3. A New Approach: Services Performed Rather Than
Compensation Received
Rather than define employee status based on compensation
a worker receives, legislators can define employee to cover any
worker who consciously renders a service (i.e., an “active”
contribution) from which the employer willingly derives an
economic benefit.96 In other words, rather than look to the
compensation received, we can look to the services performed
and accepted.
This approach is taken, with one modification, from Tadros
v. Coleman, a case that considered whether a volunteer was
protected as an “employee” under Title VII.97 Ultimately, the

96. It is natural to ask whether all such workers should be guaranteed a
wage under employment law, but this topic is beyond the scope of this Article.
97. Tadros v. Coleman, 717 F. Supp. 996, 1000 (S.D.N.Y. 1989), aff’d, 898
F.2d 10 (2d Cir. 1990).
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court held that the plaintiff, Dr. Tadros, was not protected by
Title VII because he was not paid.98 Tadros was appointed as a
“Visiting Lecturer in Ophthalmology” at Cornell Medical
College, but appears to have held no concrete responsibilities
and to have been subject to no supervision.99 He received no
compensation, although he was granted access to the medical
library.100 When his appointment was not renewed, he filed
charges with the EEOC alleging a Title VII violation.101 Before
relying on the standard compensation analysis, the court cited
FLSA’s definition of “employ” as “suffer or permit to work”102 to
make an appeal to common sense:
Congress did not invite the federal courts to serve as forums for people
who seek to air their resentments. It is axiomatic that a would-be
plaintiff must have rendered the defendant some kind of service in
order to sue under Title VII. That service, moreover, must have been
one from which the putative employer willingly derived a benefit
[citing FLSA]. Title VII does not extend to officious intermeddlers.103

This analysis, while covering a greater number of workers
than the traditional compensation analysis, offers an alternative
way of delineating which individuals an employer may be
responsible for. It looks to the benefit conferred upon the
employer by the worker, and requires that the employer take a
conscious step to accept that benefit, rather than look to the
benefit conferred upon the worker. In doing so, it excludes
“officious intermeddlers” whom the employer has not consciously
recognized. The responsibility for employers attaches when they
make the decision to benefit from a person’s work.
Applying this test would extend the provisions of labor law
to a significant number of data workers. The test requires both
that the company willfully accept the user’s conscious
contribution, and derive a benefit from the contribution. A
company might signal its willful acceptance by storing user data
on central databases, and then deploying the data for its benefit
by using it to target advertisements, for example.
The one addition this Article makes to the language from
Tadros is to require that the benefit be economic, in large part

98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.

Id. at 1004–05.
Id. at 1003.
Id. at 998.
Id. at 1000.
29 U.S.C. § 203(g) (2018).
Tadros, 717 F. Supp. at 1003 (emphasis added).
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to exclude charitable organizations that mostly act as conduits
for volunteer labor. Consider again the two explanations for why
labor demand may be low: either the employer does not stand to
benefit economically from the individual’s labor, as in the case of
a charity, or the employer has market power and reduces wages
to increase profits. In the former case, there is no economic
rationale to impose costs on the charity: if anything, the charity
and its volunteers should be rewarded by the state for the
positive externalities of their conduct. In the latter case, worker
organizing can counteract monopsony power and restore an
efficient equilibrium. By requiring that the employer benefit
economically from the labor it accepts, this test avoids burdening
charities that depend on free labor to advance the social good.
For example, Wikipedia is a non-profit organization that
depends on user contributions.104 Just like for-profit platforms,
it centrally stores user contributions, constituting conscious
acceptance. But because Wikipedia does not earn profits and
rather passes on any earnings, it does not willfully derive an
economic benefit from those contributions, and its contributors
would not be allowed to organize.
Even among for-profit platforms, the Tadros analysis would
not create legal obligations every time the platform stored
someone’s data. First, the user must render a service to the
platform. If the platform collected data that was passively
generated by a user as she went about other tasks—for instance,
browsing products on Amazon—no service would be rendered,
and that behavior would not be protected under the NLRA.
While that data is still valuable, passive data can be generated
by anyone, anytime, often with no effort at all, and passive data
workers would be difficult to organize and bargain with under a
traditional model. This definition of rendering a service as
requiring intentional action is consistent with interpretations of
the phrase in other contexts, such as assumption of duty in tort
law.105
Second, passive data is often stored for the user’s benefit,
and not the platform’s: features like AutoComplete or link
104. About, WIKIMEDIA FOUNDATION, https://wikimediafoundation.org/abo
ut(last visited Nov. 22, 2021); Who Writes Wikipedia?, WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wi
kipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia:Who_writes_Wikipedia%3F (last visited Nov. 22,
2021).
105. See Wark v. United States, 269 F.3d 1185, 1189 (10th Cir. 2001)
(requiring affirmative act or promise to act, in addition to calculation).
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suggestions use user data to enhance user productivity. Merely
implementing these features does not cause the platform to
willfully derive an economic benefit from user contributions, or
require the platform to bargain with users.
This proposal constitutes the first half of this Article’s
proposed reform to the prevailing common-law definition of
“employee.” Rather than rely on the ordinary conception of
employee as someone who works for wages, an employee may be
defined as any worker who renders a service from which the
employer willingly derives an economic benefit. The issue of
employer control is the second half of the traditional employee
definition, and the issue to which we now turn.
B. THE LIMITATIONS OF THE AGENCY MODEL
This Section reviews the control prong of the prevailing
definition of “employee” in the labor law context, and argues that
a new understanding of employee control, called the ABC test,
would protect a greater number of workers in the platform
economy. While the control requirement of the common-law
definition of employee has received significant scrutiny due to
the rise of the gig economy and hirers like Uber and Lyft,106 this
Section discusses how legislation implementing the ABC test
would protect user contributions to platforms more generally.
Most platform contributors are not controlled in the traditional
sense, because they do not report to a supervisor or have fixed
work schedules. Yet as in the gig economy, user contributions
are critical to the profitability of platforms and are subject to
forms of control that can affect users who depend on the platform
for their livelihood. This Section begins by outlining the
traditional approach and the ABC approach and then discusses
how the latter might apply to data workers.
1. Efforts to Look Beyond Control
Courts applying the NLRA traditionally define “employee”
using the common-law agency test, a multifactor test107 that has
106. See, e.g., Marina Lao, Workers in the “Gig” Economy: The Case for
Extending the Antitrust Labor Exemption, 51 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1543 (2018);
Kim, supra note 20.
107. These factors include: “the skill required; the source of the
instrumentalities and tools; the location of the work; the duration of the
relationship between the parties; whether the hiring party has the right to
assign additional projects to the hired party; the extent of the hired party’s
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been summarized as evaluating the level of control the hirer has
over the work performed: workers subject to less control tend to
be classified as independent contractors, not employees.108 The
limitations of the traditional agency approach were highlighted
in FedEx Home Delivery v. NLRB, in which the D.C. Circuit held
that FedEx delivery drivers were independent contractors not
protected by the NLRA.109 The court stated that the common-law
control analysis had been narrowed over time to exclude factors
like “evidence of unequal bargaining power” or “efforts to
monitor, evaluate, and improve” a worker’s performance,110 and
downplayed the argument that the drivers “perform a function
that is a regular and essential part of FedEx Home’s normal
operations, the delivery of packages.”111 While the court was
correct to notice that FedEx drivers are able to hire their own
employees and sell their rights to deliver along certain routes, a
later opinion by the Ninth Circuit, also concerning FedEx
drivers, highlighted different aspects of their employment that
suggested employee status but were excluded from the D.C.
Circuit’s common-law analysis.112 The court noted that FedEx
controls the appearance of the drivers and their vehicles, the
times they could work, and how and when they could deliver
packages,113 and that the company holds a veto right over driver
attempts to hire a helper or sell a route.114
Motivated by the limitations of the common-law agency test
and concerned about the variety of forms that employee control
discretion over when and how long to work; the method of payment; the hired
party’s role in hiring and paying assistants; whether the work is part of the
regular business of the hiring party; whether the hiring party is in business;
the provision of employee benefits; and the tax treatment of the hired party.”
Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 751–52 (1989) (footnotes
omitted) (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 220(2) (Am. Law Inst.
1958)) (collecting cases).
108. See FedEx Home Delivery v. NLRB, 563 F.3d 492, 496–97 (D.C. Cir.
2009) (“For a time, when applying this common law test, we spoke in terms of
an employer’s right to exercise control, making the extent of actual supervision
of the means and manner of the worker’s performance a key consideration in
the totality of the circumstances assessment.”).
109. Id. at 504.
110. Id. at 496–97 (quoting North Am. Van Lines, Inc. v. NLRB, 869 F.2d
596, 599 (D.C. Cir. 1989)).
111. Id. at 502.
112. See Alexander v. FedEx Ground Package Sys., Inc., 765 F.3d 981 (9th
Cir. 2014).
113. Id. at 990.
114. Id. at 993–94.
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can take, many states have implemented an alternative
definition of “employee” known as the ABC test, which presumes
that a worker is an employee unless each of three factors are
met:
(A) the worker is free from the control and direction of the
hirer in connection with the performance of the work, both
under the contract for the performance of the work and in
fact;
(B) the worker performs work that is outside the usual
course of the hiring entity’s business; and
(C) the worker is customarily engaged in an independently
established trade, occupation, or business of the same
nature as that involved in the work performed.115
This test places the burden on employers to prove that
workers qualify as independent contractors, and recognizes that
while a traditional control inquiry can yield ambiguous results,
certain workers may contribute so crucially to the business of
their hirer—that is, perform work that is within the “usual
course of the hiring entity’s business”—that they deserve
protections akin to those of employees, regardless of the extent
of control. Under this test, for-hire drivers have been deemed
employees of their hirers, most controversially in the context of
taxi platforms like Uber and Lyft.116
Much of the controversy over the ABC test arises from the
fact that states like California have used the test to extend legal
guarantees, like a minimum wage or unemployment insurance,
to a greater number of workers.117 For-hire platform
representatives and some workers have argued that extending
these employment benefits would impose great costs not just on

115. See 2019 Cal. Stat. § 2775; Dynamex Operations W., Inc. v. Superior
Ct. of L.A. Cty., 416 P.3d 1, 34 (Cal. 2018) (applying the ABC test to determine
whether workers should be classified as employees or independent contractors
for purposes of California wage orders); see also DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19,
§§ 3501(a)(7), 3503(c) (2019) (enacting similar definitions of employment);
MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 149, § 148B (2019) (same).
116. People v. Uber Techs., Inc., No. CGC-20-584402, 2020 Cal. Super.
LEXIS 152, at *6–8 (Cal. App. Dep’t Super. Ct. Aug. 10, 2020).
117. See Anna Deknatel & Lauren Hoff-Downing, ABC on the Books and in
the Courts: An Analysis of Recent Independent Contractor and Misclassification
Statutes, 18 U. PA. J.L. & SOC. CHANGE 53, 64–65 (2015).
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the platforms but workers themselves, who often benefit from
the flexibility of platform work.118 However, collective
bargaining is different, in that it guarantees no particular
entitlement except for the right to organize and negotiate.
Workers who value flexible work arrangements have no
obligation to organize under labor law.
2. Implications for Data Work
While there has been much discussion of how the ABC test
would affect gig workers, this Subsection makes the case that
prong (B) of the test—which covers workers who work in the
usual course of the hiring entity’s business—could encompass
many data workers who are currently unable to organize
because they are not controlled in the traditional sense.
Under the common-law approach, none of the workers
described in the Figure 1 matrix are subject to sufficient
employer control to be considered “employees.” Consider first
workers engaged in paid, creative work, like YouTube creators.
These workers meet almost none of the control factors discussed
in either the D.C. Circuit or Ninth Circuit opinions on FedEx
drivers: they are free to produce content whenever they please
and mostly in whatever format they please. Further, they have
“entrepreneurial potential,” a factor highlighted by the D.C.
Circuit as a reason for classifying FedEx drivers as independent
contractors119: many of them will seek sponsorships off the
platform and sell merchandise to supplement their income from
the platform.
The ABC test looks not just to control, but also, through its
(B) prong, the extent to which a worker performs work “in the
usual course of the hiring entity’s business.” When determining
whether a worker performs work in the “usual course of the
hiring entity’s business,” courts have looked to how
interchangeable the worker is with a typical employee, and how
important the worker is to the company’s business model. The
leading case on the topic is Dynamex Operations West, Inc. v.
Superior Court of Los Angeles County, in which the California

118. See, e.g., Dara Khosrowshahi, Opinion, I Am the C.E.O. of Uber. Gig
Workers Deserve Better., N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 10, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com
/2020/08/10/opinion/uber-ceo-dara-khosrowshahi-gig-workers-deservebetter.html.
119. FedEx Home Delivery v. NLRB, 563 F.3d 492, 498 (D.C. Cir. 2009).
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Supreme Court applied the ABC test to delivery drivers.120 In its
analysis of the (B) prong, the court said that the ABC test
protected “all individuals who are reasonably viewed as
providing services to the business in a role comparable to that of
an employee.”121 The court later elaborated that the test served
to prevent regulatory arbitrage, in which employers hired
individuals to do the work of an employee, but under a different
title, thereby avoiding the California wage orders.122 In a
footnote, it cited a case that distinguished the hiring of
specialists, who could probably not be substituted for a typical
employee at the hiring firm.123
In that same footnote, the court distinguished between
workers that were “merely incidental” to the company’s
business, and others that were an “integral part,” indicating that
the latter would be more likely to work “in the usual course of
the employer’s business.”124 It cited a Maine case where a timber
management company was held to employ a timber harvester,
in part because the company derived a “significant portion of its
profit” from selling the harvested timber.125 This approach—
looking, in essence, to the importance of the worker to the
company’s business model and profitability—was cited with
approval in a later California case applying the ABC test to Uber
drivers.126 That court cited an earlier federal case noting that
“Uber simply would not be a viable business without its
drivers.”127
If Congress amended the NLRA to use the ABC test, many
active data workers could qualify as employees in spite of their
limited control over their work, if they were deemed to perform
work within the usual course of the employer’s business. Looking
through the lens of the (B) prong of the ABC test, the inquiry
would be whether the workers substituted for employee labor
120. 416 P.3d 1, 34 (Cal. 2018).
121. Id. at 37.
122. Id. at 37–38.
123. Id. at 38 n.29 (citing Great N. Constr., Inc. v. Dept. of Labor, 161 A.3d
1207, 1215 (Vt. 2016)).
124. Id. (citing McPherson Timberlands v. Unemp. Ins. Comm’n, 714 A.2d
818 (Me. 1998)).
125. McPherson, 714 A.2d at 822.
126. People v. Uber Techs., Inc., No. CGC-20-584402, 2020 Cal. Super.
LEXIS 152, at *44 (Cal. App. Dep’t Super. Ct. Aug. 10, 2020).
127. Id. at *40 (quoting O’Connor v. Uber Techs., 82 F. Supp. 3d 1133, 1142
(N.D. Cal. 2015)).

2022]

DATA AS LABOR

163

and were integral to the company’s business, for which active
data workers will have plausible claims. In contrast, passive
data work, where a platform collects user data without the user
knowing or consciously contributing, would likely fall outside a
platform’s usual line of business. Google, for instance, provides
users with search services. Those search services are primarily
the product of search algorithms refined by Google, and it is
those services that attract users and enable Google to collect
advertising revenues, not the raw data of other users.
Extending the protections of the NLRA by implementing the
ABC test would cover active data workers that do not appear
“controlled” in the traditional sense, but who perform services
that are akin to those performed by employees and crucial to the
company’s business model. It would continue to exclude
specialists that are hired for their expertise, or for one-off jobs,
like the specialized historic restorers hired by a general
construction company referenced in Dynamex.128 But by
broadening the scope of who is allowed to collectively bargain
under American labor law, the ABC test would reduce incentives
for companies to move work to uncompensated or
underregulated sectors of the labor market.
C. IMPLEMENTATION & STATE ACTION
While there have been moves to amend the NLRA directly
and to broaden the protections of labor law on a federal level,
these moves have had limited success, leading many to abandon
federal labor law as a tool of worker empowerment.129 Efforts to
reform the NLRA continue, most notably through the proposed
Protecting the Right to Organize (PRO) Act,130 but these efforts
are likely to face similar political challenges.

128. See Dynamex Operations, 416 P.3d at 38 n.29 (citing Great N. Constr.,
Inc. v. Dep’t of Labor, 161 A.3d 1207, 1215 (Vt. 2016)) (“[A] general construction
company[] had established that the specialized historic restoration work
performed by the worker in question was outside the usual course of the
company’s business within the meaning of part B, where the work involved the
use of specialized equipment and special expertise that the company did not
possess and did not need for its usual general commercial and residential
work.”).
129. Kate Andrias, The New Labor Law, 126 YALE L.J. 2, 43–46 (2016).
130. Protecting the Right to Organize Act, H.R. 2474, 116th Cong. § 2 (2020);
Eli Rosenberg, House Passes Bill to Rewrite Labor Laws and Strengthen Unions,
WASH. POST (Feb. 6, 2020, 9:21 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/business
/2020/02/06/house-passes-bill-rewrite-labor-laws-strengthen-unions.
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In addition to federal reforms, state action presents another
pathway for broadening the protections of labor law in areas
where there is popular support. Much as states such as
California have used the ABC test to expand the breadth of
employment entitlements, states can also enact statutes
permitting individuals covered by the ABC test to form
collectives, elect representatives, and negotiate vis-à-vis
platforms. Similarly, states could enact statutes permitting
uncompensated workers to form collectives and bargain.
This strategy has notably been used by the City of Seattle to
permit for-hire drivers, who are largely considered independent
contractors under the common-law approach, to bargain
collectively with their hirers,131 although the approach has been
challenged in court because municipal action may be preempted
by federal antitrust laws.132 A similar move by a state would
have the effect of exempting covered workers from antitrust
liability for organizing under the state action doctrine, and
would not be preempted by the NLRA insofar as it covered
workers currently excluded from the federal definition of
“employee.”133
The obstacle with this approach is that it necessarily
proceeds piecemeal, and creates a patchwork of state-by-state
regulatory regimes that create compliance costs for employers.
But employers may block proposed state legislation either by
compromising with the relevant interest groups, or lobbying
Congress to speak directly to the bounds of collective bargaining
and thereby preempt state legislation. In other words, the threat
of patchwork or inconsistent regulatory regimes may be
attributed as much to the state legislation itself as to the absence
of federal legislation that enables it.
IV. RETHINKING THE BARGAINING UNIT
In addition to the question of who counts as an employee,
another crucial question of labor law is the size of the relevant
bargaining unit: in other words, which workers can a union
appropriately represent? This question is most relevant to

131. SEATTLE, WASH., ORDINANCE 124968 (Dec. 14, 2015) (codified at
SEATTLE, WASH., MUN. CODE § 6.310.735 (2020)).
132. Chamber of Commerce v. City of Seattle, 890 F.3d 769, 776 (9th Cir.
2018).
133. See Kim, supra note 20, at 464–73.

2022]

DATA AS LABOR

165

NLRB bargaining unit determinations, but is broadly relevant
to any effort to organize individuals in a representative system.
This Part examines how labor law currently defines bargaining
units and argues that a broader approach will be necessary to
accommodate platform work. Section A looks at the factors
currently used by the NLRB for enterprise bargaining, which
remains the basic unit of negotiation under the NLRA; it makes
the case that the NLRB and other government authorities will
need to consider additional factors in future adjudications,
including certain demographic factors, if labor law is to adjust to
the evolving nature of work. Section B will look to the possibility
of sectoral bargaining as an alternative to enterprise-level
bargaining, offering one possible path forward for state
legislation.
Although the bargaining unit is a concept from labor law,
any effort to build countervailing power among platform
contributors must contend with the question of how that power
will be subdivided and delegated. While larger groups acting in
concert will have greater bargaining power, they are also more
difficult to coordinate and are more likely to disagree over
central goals. Therefore, finding an ideal group size is crucial.
Traditionally, labor law identifies “communities of interest” that
share certain goals and are more likely to bargain as cohesive
wholes. The issue is how organizers can identify these
communities in a digital age.
One alternative, which is gaining greater attention in the
United States and is already practiced in Europe, is for workers
to bargain with employers on a sector-wide basis, under the
supervision and authority of the government.134 This stands in
contrast to traditional “enterprise bargaining,” in which a
company’s employees negotiate with their particular employer,
and sometimes do so in several separate negotiations, one for
each category of employee.135 This Part discusses the prospect of
sectoral bargaining among data workers, and highlights how it
may be especially appropriate for passive data workers
specifically.

134. See David Madland, How to Promote Sectoral Bargaining in the United
States, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS (July 10, 2019, 12:01 AM), https://www.americ
anprogressaction.org/issues/economy/reports/2019/07/10/174385/promotesectoral-bargaining-united-states.
135. See id.
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A. ENTERPRISE BARGAINING
Because collective bargaining under the NLRA typically
takes place at the enterprise level, this Section briefly outlines
current law on enterprise-level bargaining units, and describes
the failures of current law to define work communities in the
platform economy. It concludes by proposing that the NLRB and
other government bodies reconsider the value of worker identity
in defining labor communities, when user data is sold or
monetized according to personal characteristics.
1. The Origins of the Current Approach
The NLRB currently groups employees based on a series of
factors that have their roots in a traditional, physical worksite
with well-defined control structures. When determining whether
a bargaining unit is appropriate, the NLRB looks to whether the
workers that comprise the proposed unit share a “community of
interest,” which the NLRB may decide with nearly unreviewable
discretion.136 In making this determination, the NLRB has
historically considered a range of factors, including (a) “[d]egree
of functional integration,” (b) “[c]ommon supervision,” (c) [t]he
nature of employee skills and functions,” (d) “[i]nterchange and
contact among employees,” (e) “[w]ork situs,” (f) “[g]eneral
working conditions,” (g) “[f]ringe benefits,” and (h) “[e]mployer’s
administrative organization.”137 These factors are well-suited to
serve as proxies for “communities” within traditional
workplaces: individuals who work together in the same location
are more likely to share interests and a collective identity;
individuals who are under common supervision are more likely
to share common grievances, and so forth. Some of the factors
reflect the characteristics or activities of employees, but many of
them rely on the traditional, hierarchical control structure of
firms to approximate how workers might self-identify.
Under the NLRB’s adjudications in PCC Structurals and
Boeing, workers that comprise a bargaining unit must share a
community of interests that outweigh any similarities with

136. South Prairie Constr. Co. v. Loc. No. 627 Int’l Union of Operating
Eng’rs, 425 U.S. 800, 805 (1976) (quoting Packard Motor Car Co. v. NLRB, 330
U.S. 485, 491 (1947)).
137. NAT’L LAB. RELS. BD., AN OUTLINE OF LAW AND PROCEDURE IN
REPRESENTATION CASES 142 (2017).
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workers outside of the unit.138 While this test makes it more
difficult for workers to create small bargaining units, it also
prevents workers from being forced into a unit that may not best
represent their interests, or excluded from units that would do a
better job. The NLRB has not always followed this rule: during
the Obama administration, adjudications like Specialty
Healthcare only looked to similarities within the bargaining
unit, making it easier for smaller units to form.139 And prior to
the Taft-Hartley Act, the mere fact that workers had organized
was considered sufficient to constitute a shared “community of
interest.”140 The current state of the law respects extent of
organization as one relevant factor, but states that it cannot
stand alone, leaving the NLRB to look to other proxies for labor
community.141
There are at least two theoretical approaches that might
inform an approach to labor communities: one economic, the
other sociological.142 Under an economic analysis, a bargaining
unit should contain workers that are close substitutes.143 These
workers are most likely to be in a similar bargaining position
vis-à-vis their employer and to share grievances. Further, the
accretion of market power that results from the agreement of
market participants will be directly proportional to the
substitutability of those participants. Under this analysis, the
relevance of factors like work situs, or interchange among
employees, makes intuitive sense. In a traditional workplace, it
may make more sense for a New York-based worker to organize
with another New York worker, rather than one in California,
because the New York manager may care very little about what
the worker in California does.
Another motivating theory is sociological: bargaining units
should contain workers that share a common identity or sense of

138. PCC Structurals, Inc., 365 NLRB No. 160, slip op. at 5 (Dec. 15, 2017);
Boeing Co., 368 NLRB No. 67, slip op. at 3 (Sept. 9, 2019).
139. Specialty Healthcare and Rehabilitation Center of Mobile, 357 N.L.R.B.
934, 944–46 (2011).
140. Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act of 1947, Pub. L. No.
80-101, § 101, § 9(c)(5), 61 Stat. 136, 144 (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 159(c)(5)
(2018)).
141. Id.
142. Martin H. Malin, The National Labor Relations Act in Cyberspace:
Union Organizing in Electronic Workplaces, 49 U. KAN. L. REV. 1, 13–18 (2000).
143. Id. at 15.

168

MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH.

[Vol. 23:1

kinship.144 Workers who share social bonds are more likely to
share values and cooperate in building constructive proposals for
management. Under this analysis, factors like work situs and
interchange among employees still make sense, but for a
different reason. In a traditional workplace, workers who report
to the same facility are more likely to befriend and converse with
each other. It may make more sense for two New York workers
to bargain together because they already know each other, and
perhaps share similar values and objectives.
2. A New Approach for the Platform Economy
A primary challenge for labor law in the coming years will
be to identify worker communities as traditional workplaces
move online. The emergence of platform-mediated digital work
squarely challenges the two assumptions upon which the
traditional “community of interest” factors are based: namely,
that workplaces are physical,145 and rely on centralized and
hierarchical control structures to deploy labor. Many
contributors to online platforms will never see their cocontributors in person: consider, for instance, a YouTube content
creator, who can accomplish all of her work from home. Further,
most data platforms accept and monetize user contributions
without placing users into specified departments or under the
responsibility of company executives. Rather, much of the
supervision often falls to algorithms that monitor the entire
platform.
This problem is similar to the original question of how
workers for common carriers—like railroads and airlines—
might organize and be regulated.146 These workers, too, lacked
the physical connections of a shared workplace, and could move
between different administrative units of a single business. The
ultimate solution—the Railway Labor Act—endorsed a national
form of bargaining under which any employee involved in a
“craft or trade,” regardless of location, could form a bargaining
unit.147 A similar regulatory framework, relying on nationwide
144. Id. at 16–18.
145. The move to remote work during the COVID-19 pandemic also puts
pressure on this assumption.
146. See Malin, supra note 142, at 33–37.
147. See 45 U.S.C. § 152 (2018); see also Allied Pilots Ass’n, 22 N.M.B. 331,
426, 432–33 (1995) (holding that various carriers are classified as one
transportation system).
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bargaining, could be created for data workers, as discussed in
the next Section. But it is likely that smaller-scale bargaining
would precede a national effort.
In the data economy, and in particular the market for
passively produced user information, a user’s personal,
identifying characteristics—such as age or residence—are
relevant for organizing to a much greater extent than in a
traditional workplace. Labor law has traditionally disfavored
creating bargaining units along demographic characteristics,148
preferring groupings based on an employer’s control structures.
But these control structures will be much less obvious as work
moves online.
User contributions to platforms are frequently grouped and
monetized based on demographic characteristics, creating
constituencies along those lines. Consider, for instance, the
Cambridge Analytica data breach, which disproportionately
affected Facebook users from particular states: California,
Texas, and Florida users were most represented in the leaked
data.149 If users in Florida—who might perceive their votes as
especially important given their swing-state status—wanted to
lobby for stricter regulations on how Facebook protected their
data, that geographic grouping would be coherent from both an
economic and sociological perspective. For a political strategist,
data on Florida voters cannot be interchanged with data on
California voters, and Floridians may have a sense of collective
identity and kinship predicated on where they live and their
importance to national elections. This is all true even though
Facebook may not treat Floridians any differently in how they
interact with the platform, or subject them to any different types
of control or supervision. What differentiates users is how their
inputs—namely, data—are deployed by the platform, often in
ways that make them non-substitutable.
As the data economy grows, it may be appropriate to
organize platform users according to user demographics, when
passive user data is marketed and sold along those very
demographic factors. In addition to situations where the
148. See NAT’L LAB. RELS. BD., supra note 137, at 149 (listing cases in which
the NLRB declined to separate laborers into units based on age, sex, or race).
149. Richard Nieva, Most Facebook Users Hit by Cambridge Analytica
Scandal Are Californians, CNET (June 13, 2018, 1:27 PM), https://www.cnet
.com/news/most-facebook-users-hit-by-cambridge-analytica-scandal-arecalifornians.
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relevance of personal characteristics may be obvious—like the
Cambridge Analytica example above—regulators can look to the
structure of the data tables shared by platforms with purchasers
or users of its data, as a signal of what fields may be relevant to
those purchasers or users. For instance, if credit card data is sold
with the user’s location and age, it is likely that user data may
be deployed differently depending on those characteristics.
Under PCC Structurals, workers proposing bargaining units will
still need to demonstrate that the commonalities within their
group outweigh the commonalities across groups.150 For
instance, if a group of Facebook users with a certain eye color
decided to make a concerted complaint against the platform, it
is unclear why their eye color creates a community of interest
when Facebook’s platform itself does not facially distinguish
between eye colors. In this way, the PCC Structurals standard
may be useful in ensuring that bargaining units do not become
arbitrarily small.
For more highly organized platforms like Facebook, and
others at the top of the spectrum in Figure 2, the platform’s own
data on user interactions and groupings will be informative, if
not dispositive, to understanding how users group themselves.
Tools like Facebook groups allow users to define their own
communities and interest groups, and may reveal shared values
in a way that is relevant for structuring bargaining units.
As discussed, it is unclear whether the NLRA will ever be
amended to encompass a greater number of workers, and so the
question of how the NLRB will define bargaining units in the
platform economy may be unnecessary to answer. But even short
of amendments to the NLRA, these questions of identity in a
digital workplace may arise anyway if remote work continues to
become more popular among workers traditionally considered
employees.151
B. SECTORAL BARGAINING
Because enterprise-level bargaining tends to fragment
worker bargaining power along firm lines and is generally
150. PCC Structurals, Inc., 365 NLRB No. 160, slip op. at 9 (Dec. 15, 2017).
151. See Kim Parker et al., How the Coronavirus Outbreak Has—and
Hasn’t—Changed the Way Americans Work, PEW RSCH. CTR. (Dec. 9, 2020),
https://www.pewresearch.org/social-trends/2020/12/09/how-the-coronavirus-ou
tbreak-has-and-hasnt-changed-the-way-americans-work
(describing
the
increased prevalence of work from home and shifts in preferences).
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incapable of addressing sector-wide labor grievances, labor
activists have made the case for sector-wide, or sectoral
bargaining, as a way of ensuring fair compensation and
treatment across an industry.152 While sectoral bargaining can
take on a variety of forms, it usually relies on governmental
authority to extend protections beyond the group of workers that
lobbied for them, to the industry as a whole.153 For example, in
a workers’ board, worker representatives consult with business
leaders and government officials to propose regulations to
government agencies, which can enact the regulations as law.154
While enterprise-level bargaining is the default under the
NLRA, sectoral bargaining is common in many European
countries155 and Australia, where it has been credited with
increasing worker wages and decreasing inequality.156 Workers’
boards are gaining traction in the United States, where many
states have enacted statutes authorizing them.157 In addition to
augmenting worker bargaining power with the authority of the
government, sectoral bargaining reduces the likelihood that any
single employer will be competitively disadvantaged by worker
organizing, because any concessions will also be imposed on
competitors.158
Because sectoral bargaining works by finding common
grievances within large worker bodies, it may be especially
relevant for passive data workers. Recall that this Article
defines passive data work as the unconscious generation of data

152. See, e.g., Madland, supra note 134 (discussing how sectoral bargaining
can create even more positive change than enterprise bargaining).
153. See id.
154. See Kate Andrias, David Madland, & Malkie Wall, A How-To Guide for
State and Local Workers’ Boards, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS 1 (Dec. 2019),
https://cf.americanprogress.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/12/Wage-BoardReport.pdf.
155. Dylan Matthews, Europe Could Have the Secret to Saving America’s
Unions, VOX (Apr. 17, 2017, 9:30 AM EDT), https://www.vox.com/policy-andpolitics/2017/4/17/15290674/union-labor-movement-europe-bargaining-fight15-ghent.
156. Arindrajit Dube, Using Wage Boards to Raise Pay, ECONOMISTS FOR
INCLUSIVE
PROSPERITY
4
(Dec.
2018),
https://econfip.org/wpcontent/uploads/2019/02/4.Using-Wage-Boards-to-Raise-Pay.pdf.
157. See Andrias, Madland & Wall, supra note 154, at 4–5 (quoting various
state statutes); Andrias, supra note 129, at 46–47 (describing the “Fight for $15”
minimum wage movement in the United States as a form of sectoral
bargaining).
158. See Matthews, supra note 155.
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in the course of platform use: individuals who use Google Search,
for instance, produce data that is useful and monetizable by the
firm, but that data is largely a byproduct of platform use, as
opposed to a service or conscious contribution made by the user.
While these sorts of users contribute value to platforms and may
have grievances directed toward the platforms, organizing them
through a traditional enterprise-bargaining model would be
difficult, because any given platform will have countless passive
contributors, and their interactions with the platform will be
intermittent. Coordinating a vast and un-organized workforce
through NLRB-approved bargaining units would be challenging,
and each platform would be required to negotiate with each
successful unit, entailing significant coordination and
negotiation costs. Sectoral bargaining would combine many of
those hypothetical negotiations into one, under the supervision
of the government and led by representative platform users.
States interested in extending protections to data workers
can enact legislation authorizing the use of workers’ boards, as
has been done in California, Colorado, and New Jersey.159 States
could then create a data work board, or more likely establish
boards concerning specific types of data work. As in other
sectors, representatives from government, labor, and business
would negotiate proposed regulations on these topics, which
would then be passed on for consideration by a governmental
agency.
One challenge in enabling sectoral bargaining for platform
users will be identifying representative users to take part in
worker board negotiations. Traditionally, many workers’ boards
have drawn their representatives from existing labor
organizations, who can use their member bases as evidence that
they represent a significant portion of workers.160 Until
enterprise-level bargaining among data workers progresses
further, data workers’ boards would likely have to rely on other
means of choosing representatives.161 Given the homogeneity of
passive data workers as a class—and the fact that large numbers

159. Dylan Matthews, Governors in These States Can Give Workers a Raise
With the Stroke of a Pen, VOX (July 19, 2019, 12:00 PM), https://www.vox.com/f
uture-perfect/2019/7/19/20698079/wage-boards-union-labor-movementcalifornia-colorado-new-jersey.
160. See Andrias, Madland & Wall, supra note 154, at 6 (describing ways to
select members of the board).
161. Id.
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of workers will be governed by similar terms and conditions—
these alternative selection mechanisms may still produce
representatives who can competently negotiate for their class.
Another challenge is that sectoral bargaining exacerbates
the free-riding problem of collective bargaining, since workers do
not need to be a part of a union or pay dues to benefit from
negotiations.162 For this reason, sectoral bargaining works best
in countries with already high union density.163 Many
Scandinavian countries give unions responsibility for running
unemployment insurance, under the “Ghent system”—this
creates an obvious incentive for workers to join unions, and these
countries have among the highest union densities in the
world.164 Therefore, the success of sectoral bargaining may be
tied to the success of enterprise-level bargaining.
One crucial benefit of sectoral bargaining is states and
localities can legislate to permit such bargaining without fear of
federal preemption. While state legislation that touches on
traditional enterprise-level bargaining for employees is broadly
preempted under the NLRA, sectoral bargaining does not
encroach on the NLRB’s jurisdiction and may be pursued
independent of federal action.165 Therefore, workers who find an
unsympathetic audience in the federal government can pursue
state action, and vice versa.
Despite its limitations, sectoral bargaining presents a useful
alternate strategy to labor activists if federal action is not
forthcoming, and is especially useful within the context of
passive data work given its ability to affect large worker bodies
at once. Although sectoral bargaining benefits from enterpriselevel bargaining—both because the latter increases union
density and eases the selection of representatives—the reverse
may be true as well, since sectoral bargaining can galvanize
more workers to get involved.166

162. See Matthews, supra note 155 (“Sectoral bargaining creates a free-rider
problem even bigger than our current free-rider problem at the enterprise level,
because all workers benefit from the higher wages that are negotiated . . . [s]o
you have a strong disincentive to pay dues.”).
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id.
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V. CONCLUSION
As the platform economy grows and data becomes an
increasingly valuable commodity, individuals who contribute
their data increasingly desire a say in how their data are used.
This Article has made the case that labor law can provide a
framework for granting active contributors a collective voice, but
doing so will require reconceptualizing both what it means to be
a worker or employee, and how collective bargaining should
occur. Under current law, the definition of “employee” that
bounds the protections of the NLRA limits collective bargaining
protections to workers who are both compensated and controlled
by their hirers, excluding individuals who contribute for free or
lack a formal supervisor. Once classified as an employee,
workers are permitted to form bargaining units within physical
plants or supervision units, but many workers today neither
work in a fixed physical location nor report to a traditional
supervisor.
In response, state and federal legislators should consider
enabling uncompensated workers to organize, or expanding the
requirement that organizing workers be controlled in the
common-law sense. Further, organizers and regulators may
decide to define communities of interest along personal
characteristics when user data is monetized or deployed along
demographic lines. These changes have the potential to facilitate
important conversations between stakeholders in the platform
economy and extend the relevance of labor law as work moves
online.

